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This thesis was a case study to validate the use of IMPRINT Pro Forces model 
simulations and FAST model predictions for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) manpower 
requirements. Input data were derived from data cards collected by the Center for Naval 
Analysis during an underway with LCS 1 Freedom in Fall 2013 and from information 
shared by the LCS Program Office, San Diego. A survey was administered to the current 
crewmembers of the USS Independence (LCS 2) to assess the crew’s perception of the 
adequacy of current manning concepts and to further validate the IMPRINT and FAST 
model outputs.  
Using IMPRINT Pro Forces software, three different LCS core crew sizes were 
modeled to assess how each was able to handle day-to-day operations, maintenance, and 
emergencies during a (notional) operational underway. As crew sizes are reduced, 
individual performance becomes increasingly important. Multiple watch schedules were 
modeled using the FAST software tool, which uses the SAFTE model to predict 
individual cognitive effectiveness levels using a simulated work and sleep schedules.  
Using the IMPRINT Pro Forces modeling tool, this study found measurable and 
significant differences in performance among the three core crew sizes as assessed by 
ANOVA and Tukey tests. The FAST results showed conclusively that individual 
performance is significantly affected by the watch rotation a sailor stands. Although this 
thesis focused on the crew of the LCS, the modeling approach and analytical process can 
be expanded and applied to a wide range of ships and departments. 
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Over a decade ago, the United States Navy (USN) launched the Surface 
Combatant Program. Three new classes of ships were developed: the DD(X) Destroyer 
(re-designated the DDG-1000), the CG(X) Cruiser, and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). 
Their development signaled a departure from legacy ships in that each aimed to substitute 
advanced technology and automation for manpower—an extension of a decade-long, 
experimental policy called optimal manning. This policy prioritized re-organizing work, 
cross-training personnel, and substituting automation for sailors in order to reduce  
crew sizes. To date, however, these acquisitions have fallen short of the vision that was 
cast for them as evidenced by the reduction of the DDG-1000 class to only three  
ships, the termination of the CG(X), and reductions of LCS combatants from 52 to just  
24 (O’Rourke, 2014). Bloated development costs and downsized budgets are largely to 
blame for the termination of the CG(X) program and the drastic reductions in the DD(X) 
and LCS. Since these ships were designed to operate with crew sizes far smaller than 
legacy ships, these reductions could also be indicative of a failed manpower strategy in 
addition to budget battles.  
The U.S. Navy has struggled with shipboard manning levels over the last decade. 
Optimal manning was conceived to control costs; its practice, however, has put undue 
stress on sailors who are overworked and ships that fail to pass inspections. The failure  
of this strategy came about, for the most part, because the workload reductions promised 
by the new technology did not occur. As billets were reduced to comply with optimal 
manning policies, the workload of those remaining personnel increased—sometimes to 
the breaking point. Failed periodic readiness inspections and decreased maintenance 
capability over the past decade caused Navy leadership to re-evaluate optimal manning as 
a policy, as well as the practice of minimal manning. In 2011, Undersecretary of the 
Navy Robert Work said, “We have concluded [optimal manning] went too far… 
The material condition of the fleet we believe suffered because of it” (as cited in  
Fuentes, 2011).  
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In order to ensure the full service life of its ships, the Navy has reversed course, 
sending thousands of sailors to fill “optimal manning” billets previously cut from 
cruisers, destroyers, and dock landing ships (Fuentes, 2011). It is critical to accurately 
determine the manpower required to operate a ship. Overstating enlisted ship manpower 
requirements diverts limited resources away from other important expenditures. 
Understating manpower requirements, on the other hand, can negatively impact ship 
operations, maintenance, crew performance, morale, readiness, and ultimately, mission 
accomplishment. 
A. CASE STUDY BACKGROUND  
Our Navy starts with the Fleet. Everything we do must keep the Fleet 
ready and make it even better. We must accurately define and 
continuously validate our requirements, then move aggressively to fully 
fund those requirements. In doing so, we will ensure the Fleet remains 
ready to fight and win. 
—Admiral Vern Clark, CNO 2002 (Ham, 2002) 
Manpower can easily become the largest cost of any developed system; thus, the 
desire to reduce manpower and its costs will always be present (Alper & Koopman, 
2006). In contrast, ensuring correct manning levels for proper ship operation and safety is 
vitally important and requires constant evaluation of the Navy’s fleet manpower 
determination processes and policies. This thesis will serve as a case study to assess the 
accuracy and feasibility of using government-developed, human performance software to 
assist in ship manpower determination. A software program called the Improved 
Performance Research Integration Tool (IMPRINT) Pro has been under development  
by the U.S. Army Human Research and Development Command for the past decade 
(U.S. Army Research Laboratory, 2010).  
An IMPRINT model was built of the crew of the LCS to understand the effects of 
different ship crew sizes. In addition, the Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST), an 
instantiation of the Sleep, Activity, Fatigue, and Task Effectiveness (SAFTE) model, was 
applied to aid in understanding how human cognitive effectiveness fluctuates as a 
function of work schedule and sleep at the individual level (Institutes for Behavior 
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Resources, 2012). When crew size decreases, workload and crew fatigue almost always 
increase, leading to a decline in combat readiness and other negative consequences.  
The Navy designed the LCS to operate with a crew severely reduced in 
comparison to other ships of similar size (e.g., light frigates or coast guard cutters). An 
LCS operates with a core crew of only 40, not including the commanding officer (CO), 
executive officer (XO), and command master chief (CMC). To operate with a core crew 
of this size, the LCS relies heavily on automation and supplements its core crew with 
additional sailors from whatever mission module is onboard. The mission module 
crewmembers also help operate weapon systems and aircraft, in addition to performing 
tasks specific to that mission. Compared to the 200+ sailors operating a Navy frigate, or 
the 300+ crewmembers operating cruisers and destroyers (O’Rourke, 2012), the size of 
an LCS core crew seems exceptionally small. Congressional reports have questioned the 
sufficiency of this core crew size stating that, in addition to creating a fragile operating 
environment, crew fatigue sets in by the third day underway (Carpaccio, 2013). Previous 
Naval Postgraduate School theses have also suggested that an LCS core crew of 40 is 
neither sufficient nor sustainable (Douangaphaivong, 2004; Williams-Robinson, 2007).  
IMPRINT Pro and FAST are both products developed by the Department of 
Defense (DOD), and are designed to assist in conducting human performance analyses. 
IMPRINT Pro consists of four autonomous modules: the Mission module, the Equipment 
module, the Warfighter module, and the Forces module. Each module is purposely 
designed to offer specific data outputs to inform different decisions. IMPRINT Pro 
Forces module has been designed to estimate manpower requirements at the unit level. 
More specifically, using stochastic simulation, it can be used to predict the manpower 
needed to perform the routine work done by a force unit. The U.S. Navy has used the 
IMPRINT Mission, Equipment and Warfighter modules with success; however, the 
IMPRINT Forces module has never before been used for Fleet manpower determination. 
FAST is a quick, easy, and portable software tool that uses a person’s 72-hour sleep 
history to calculate the work schedule and watch rotation effects on an individual’s 
predicted alertness and cognitive effectiveness. The FAST software program has been 
used operationally by the U.S. Air Force, the Naval Safety Center, the Federal Aviation 
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Administration, and the Federal Railroad Administration. It is the official model selected 
by the Department of Defense to predict individual cognitive effectiveness. Used 
together, IMPRINT Pro Forces and FAST have the potential to evaluate the effect of 
manning levels for various naval units, including the LCS. Ultimately, these software 
programs may be beneficial in the Navy’s fleet manpower determination process. 
B. CASE STUDY OVERVIEW  
This thesis is an LCS manpower case study developed in three distinct efforts: 
IMPRINT Pro Forces model simulations, FAST model predictions, and a survey 
administered to the current crewmembers of the USS Independence (LCS 2) to assess 
their perception of the adequacy of current manning concepts.  
Three different LCS force units representing three different LCS core crew sizes 
were created using IMPRINT Pro Forces software. The IMPRINT Pro Forces module 
gives performance data for a collective unit; it does not, however, show the effectiveness 
of an individual throughout a period of time. As crew sizes are reduced, individual 
performance becomes increasingly important since there is no spare crew capacity to fall 
back upon in the case of a crewmember’s incapacitation. 
FAST uses the SAFTE model to predict cognitive effectiveness. FAST model 
predictions for this case study involved modeling notional watch schedules using the 
FAST software tool, which uses the SAFTE model to predict individual cognitive 
effectiveness levels using a simulated work and sleep schedule. The FAST results for this 
case study give the reader a general idea of a sailor’s predicted effectiveness level while 
executing daily tasks under certain work and rest schedules.  
For the third portion of this thesis, a survey was developed specifically for this 
case study and administered to the crewmembers of LCS 2 to elicit their feedback on 
current watch rotations, sufficiency of allotted manpower, and daily operational 
requirements. This survey was constructed, in part, to see how well the output and results 
of the IMPRINT Pro Forces and FAST models reflect actual LCS crewmember 
perceptions of the current manpower condition.  
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C. LCS BACKGROUND  
Slightly smaller than a frigate, the LCS is a multi-functional platform, designed to 
replace USN guided missile frigates (FFGs), mine countermeasure ships (MCMs), and 
patrol crafts (PCs). There are two variants of the LCS platform, as shown in Figure 1. 
The first platform design that was built, the USS Freedom (LCS 1), is a monohull design, 
developed and built by Lockheed Martin at Marinette Marine in Marinette, Wisconsin. 
The second platform design, the USS Independence (LCS 2), is a trimaran design, 
developed and built by General Dynamics at the Austal USA Shipyard in Mobile, 
Alabama. As stated in OPNAVINST 3501.352 (a rough draft of the required operational 
capability/projected operational environment (ROC/POE) for LCS), the LCS is designed 
to operate offensively in a multi-threat environment concentrated in near-shore waters 
independently or as an integral member of a carrier strike group (CSG), expeditionary 
strike group (ESG), or surface action group. The key feature of LCS is its reconfigurable 
mission packages that allow the ship to refocus war fighting capability between different 
mission areas, including mine counter-measures (MCM), surface warfare (SUW), or anti-




Figure 1.  Lockheed LCS design (top) and General Dynamics LCS design (bottom) 
(from O’Rourke, 2012) 
1. LCS Manning 
Originally, the LCS was designed to operate with a total core crew of 40, not 
including the CO, XO, and CMC. This core crew of 40 was comprised of eight officers 
and 32 enlisted sailors. The LCS currently employs a Blue-Gold manning concept, where 
two core crews conduct a swap midway through deployment, allowing the ship to remain 
on station. In order for an LCS to operate with minimal manning and rotating crews, 
sailors are required to have multiple skills and perform multiple functions. Every sailor 
fills a billet that has extensive and well-defined training requirements for maintenance 
duties, watch standing, and other tasks.  
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The LCS capabilities are based on interchangeable, “plug-and-fight” mission 
packages (MPs) focused on ASW, MCM, and SUW. The different LCS mission packages 
come with their own operators and maintainers in addition to the LCS core crew. Each 
MP typically contains 15 to 20 sailors depending on the package, and an air detachment 
crew of 20 to 25. The core crew is designed to operate the ship independently, since an 
MP crew and/or air detachment are not always aboard the ship.  
2. Current LCS Manning 
LCS 2 operates with an intended core crew size of 40, not including CO, XO, and 
CMC. LCS 1 originally operated with the intended core crew size of 40; however, it 
received a core crew “plus up” of nine enlisted sailors and one officer before its first 
operational deployment, bringing its core crew total to 50 sailors, not including the CO, 
XO, and CMC. These numbers were based on the LCS activity manpower document 
(AMD) and data cards collected by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) from the USS 
Freedom’s (LCS 1) first deployment on March 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013. CDR 
Daniel Degner, COMLCSRON ONE N5/N8, provided these data cards to NPS. 
According to the CNA data cards for LCS 1 Blue Crew, the following nine enlisted 
sailors were added to each department: four to engineering, two to operations, two to 
combat systems, and one to supply to total an enlisted core crew size of 40 and a  
total LCS core crew size of 50. (For unknown reasons, LCS 1 Blue Crew had data  
on only 31 enlisted core crew before the “plus up” of nine enlisted, versus Gold Crew’s 
32 enlisted core crew.)  
D. CASE STUDY ORGANIZATION 
For the IMPRINT modeling effort of this thesis, three different models were made 
using the different LCS enlisted core crew sizes of 31, 40, and 48 (corresponding to a 
total core crew of 40, 50, and 60 when officers are included) to determine which core 
crew size showed the best response to planned activities and unplanned events during a 
notional underway period. The initial IMPRINT Pro Forces model was based upon Blue 
Crew’s enlisted core crew of 31, since the CNA data for the Blue Crew was more 
complete. The first model reflects the LCS 1 enlisted core crew manning level without 
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the nine enlisted sailor “plus up,” as well as the initial enlisted manpower estimates for 
the LCS. (The enlisted core crew size of 31 is meant to simulate an LCS total core crew 
of 40.) The second model was built using 40 enlisted core crew sailors to reflect the 
current LCS 1 enlisted manning level with the “plus up” of nine enlisted core crew sailors 
(The LCS enlisted core crew size of 40 is meant to simulate an LCS total core crew of 
50.) The third model was built as a notional enlisted core crew of 48 to test IMPRINT 
Pro’s ability to measure differences in multiple crew sizes. (The LCS enlisted core crew 
size of 48 is meant to simulate an LCS total core crew of 60, assuming a total of  
12 officers.) For the notional enlisted core crew of 48, two enlisted sailors were added to 
each of the following LCS departments: engineering, operations, combat systems, and 
supply. 
For the second part of the thesis, FAST was used to analyze current watch 
schedules found on LCS 1 and LCS 2. Because the results of the IMPRINT Pro Forces 
module address the total crew and do not reflect the effectiveness of an individual 
throughout a period of time, FAST was used to estimate individual effectiveness levels.   
We reviewed the individual activity data from each of the three IMPRINT models and 
reviewed output data from Random Seed Number 3. We then reviewed the individual 
data from the two sailors with the most and least sleep from each crew. We then modeled 
their 21-day schedules in FAST.   
Part three of this thesis contains the results of a survey administered to the Gold 
Crew aboard the Independence (LCS 2) in January of 2014. This baseline survey was 
developed to collect data on crewmember attitudes about LCS during an actual underway 
period. The survey was developed specifically for this case study and was administered to 
LCS 2 crewmembers to solicit personal opinions about current watch rotations, the 
relative workload of departments and positions, and the amount of sleep that current 
watch rotations allow. 
E. CASE STUDY OBJECTIVES 
The first objective of this case study was to assess the applicability of using 
human performance software to validate manpower requirements and to determine what 
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utility IMPRINT Pro Forces offers in predicting manpower levels. When used correctly, 
human performance software can inform ship manpower estimates and help prevent the 
execution difficulties that often occur after manpower requirements are determined for 
new acquisitions and existing platforms. Together, the three sections of this thesis are 
meant to assess the use of human performance modeling tools as additional resources that 
decision makers can use to determine ship manpower requirements. The second objective 
of this case study is to assess the capability of IMPRINT Pro Forces to determine 
manpower requirements for an LCS force unit by first determining if the enlisted core 
crews of 31, 40, and 48 provide adequate manning to successfully complete all planned 
activities and unplanned events during a notional 21-day underway period. Differences 
between each core crew model are analyzed and then tested for statistical significance 
using an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test to detect significant differences (p < .05) 
exist among the three models. The Tukey Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) test is 
used to show where those differences exist. The third objective of this case study is to use 
FAST to analyze different watch schedules found on LCS 1 and LCS 2. Because the 
results of the IMPRINT Pro Forces module address the total crew and do not reflect the 
effectiveness of an individual throughout a period of time, FAST is also used to illustrate 
the effectiveness levels of individual sailors dependent upon work start and end times, 
and the watch rotations and sleep times simulated by IMPRINT Pro Forces. The LCS 2 
survey collected data on crewmembers’ perceptions of the watch rotations, the underway 
workload of departments and positions, and the amount of sleep the current watch 
rotations allow underway in order to see if the IMPRINT Pro Forces and FAST model 
outputs are correctly reflected in LCS crewmember responses. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. FLEET MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION 
1. Process 
The primary facility for determining fleet manpower requirements is the Naval 
Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) in Millington, Tennessee. NAVMAC used a 
multistep process in manpower requirements determinations. The first step identifies 
“zero-based” manpower requirements, those requirements determined without regard to 
funding constraints, by gathering a variety of inputs from the fleet. Once NAVMAC 
determines these requirements, they become the wartime requirement. A requirement 
becomes a billet once funding and end-strength are allocated during the planning, 
programming, budgeting, and execution system (PPBES) process, which takes into 
account fiscal constraints and will not be discussed further.  
The OPNAVINST 1000.16K, Manual of Navy Total Force Manpower Policies 
and Procedures, is the overarching naval instruction that provides guidance on manpower 
policy and procedures. This document explains the processes for ship manpower 
determination, and specifies that personnel levels must be adequate to perform the 
Navy’s work and carry out specific missions. However, as policy, the DoD requires that 
the Navy use the “least number of people possible” to accomplish its missions (Moore et 
al., 2002, p. 12). 
There are three main documents that result from the Fleet manpower requirements 
determination process. The required operational capabilities (ROC) and the projected 
operational environment (POE) document establishes ship missions and capabilities and 
provides a measurable level of crew workload for a specific class of ships, such as an 
LCS. Minimum manpower requirement levels are based on these workloads. To 
determine the manpower requirements (at the most basic level), NAVMAC uses an 
approved Navy standard workweek (NSWW) to calculate the minimum number of 
personnel required to accomplish average, daily workload and all the missions and tasks 
of the ROC/POE. These numbers are then reflected in the class ship manpower document 
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(SMD). Once the manpower requirements are identified in the SMD and funded by the 
PPBES process, they become billets and are identified in activity AMDs by unit 
identification code (UIC).  
2. Navy Standard Workweek 
The Navy Standard Workweek (NSWW) gives baseline timetables for personnel 
work, watch, and duty requirements for operational afloat and ashore commands. These 
workweek standards can be found in OPNAVINST 1000.16K. NSWWs are one of the 
key elements used in manpower requirement calculations, and are intended as tools for 
managing personnel and establishing working hours. Commands, however, are under no 
obligation to adhere to them. 
LCS manpower requirements are determined by NAVMAC using the afloat 
(wartime) NSWW, which assumes steaming in wartime/deployed cruising readiness 
under a three-section watch. There are 168 hours in a week. The NSWW further divides 
this time into 81 hours of available time and 87 hours of non-available time. Of the  
81 hours of available time each week, the time of a  sailor is allocated to 56 hours of 
watch, 14 hours of work, and 11 hours of training/service diversion, equating to 70 hours 
per week available (56 hrs of watch + 14 hrs of work) for productive work. The 87 hours 
of non-available time consists of 56 hours of sleep (8 hours per 24 hour period), 14 hours 
for eating (messing), and 17 hours of free time (which includes 3 hours of extra free time 
on Sundays). Figure 2 displays the afloat NSWW. These times are only guidelines to 
model sustained workforce schedules and do not reflect personnel endurance limits. 
IMPRINT may be helpful in addressing inadequacies in the current NSWW models.  
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Figure 2.  Afloat (wartime) NSWW (from DON, 2007). For watch standers, 
56 hours is allocated to watch stations (8 hours x 7 days) (14 hours 
available for work in addition to 56 hours watch standing = 70 hours) 
The NSWW is one of the primary metrics used by NAVMAC to determine fleet 
manpower. NAVMAC translates workload estimates into manpower requirements 
(billets) using the navy manpower requirements system (NMRS). At the most basic level, 
this NMRS uses an interactive optimization program that bases crewmember productive 
work on the NSWW (Moore et al., 2002). To ensure that naval ships are manned at 
sufficient levels, it is important that the NSWW and the assumptions used to translate 
workload into manpower requirements remain applicable. Efforts designed to reduce 
manpower requirements in technologically advanced ships have led to crew sizes far 
smaller than those seen in the past. The smaller the crew the less they are able to absorb 
extra work. Thus, ensuring the accuracy of the NSWW is even more important.  
Various allowances are used by NAVMAC to ensure the NMRS output is an 
accurate calculation of workforce requirements. For example, the Productivity Allowance 
is a “percentage applied to basic productive work requirements to reflect delays from 
fatigue, environmental effects, personal needs, and unavoidable interruptions, increasing 
time required for work to be accomplished”; the Make Ready/Put Away Allowance refers 
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to “steps required in obtaining and returning necessary instruction manuals, tools, and 
materials and transit to and from the work area (GAO, 2010, p. 5).”   
The Navy’s optimal manning initiative was in place from 2001 to 2009 and 
resulted in a 20% decrease in enlisted requirements (GAO, 2010). To achieve this 
reduction in personnel, certain standards used to determine workforce requirements were 
altered. To decrease workforce requirements, NAVMAC increased the NSWW from  
67 to 70 hours productive work hours and substantially decreased allowances. For 
example, the Make Ready/Put Away Allowance was reduced from 30% to 15% and the 
Productivity Allowance was reduced from 20% to a floating range between 2% and 8% 
(GAO, 2010). In short, constraints to NMRS were reduced in order to reduce ship crew 
sizes. However, this GAO report and another similar report from the Naval Audit Service 
(2005), “found that these changes were not based on verifiable analysis or data” and were 
not the result of the type of analysis required by OPNAVINST 1000.16K (GAO, 2010, 
p. 18). Surface manpower levels were changed without verifiable, justifiable data, and the 
negative outcomes associated with these changes were alarming. A report entitled The 
Fleet Review Panel of Surface Force Readiness (2010) documented many of these 
negative outcomes. The three-hour increase to productive work hours alone reduced 
shipboard manning by up to 4% and optimal manning cut 4,052 sailors from surface 
ships, but workload reductions did not decrease along with manpower (Balisle, 2010). 
Remaining Sailors could not adequately handle the workload and their morale, health, 
and performance declined along with the material readiness of the fleet (Balisle, 2010). 
According to the 2007 article, Avoiding A Second Hollow Force: The Case for Including 
Crew Endurance Factors in the Afloat Staffing Policies of the U.S. Navy: 
The Navy should expand its investment in human systems integration, 
focusing on human performance as a critical component of total system 
performance. Thereby, we will ensure that future platforms have fully 
integrated the human strengths and weaknesses into the system design. 
Such actions will lead to the right answer, resulting in optimal use of 
scarce human resources. The Navy needs a better understanding of the 
consequences of these manning decisions if we are to deliver the level of 
combat capability required to protect our national interests abroad. (Miller 
& Firehammer, 2007, p. 95) 
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The material readiness of surface ships and the health and performance of sailors, are 
dependent on adequate manning levels, therefore the Navy must ensure that these 
manpower levels are accurately determined. 
B. HUMAN PERFORMANCE FACTORS 
Systems are comprised of both human and technological subsystems (Miller, 
Crowson & Narkevicius, 2003; Shattuck & Miller, 2007). When manpower levels are 
reduced to a minimum level, it is critically important to understand the consequences this 
action will have on the human part of the system—and it is therefore even more 
important to understand the strengths and limitations of the humans operating and 
maintaining these systems.  
Human beings are not machines. However, like machines, they do require 
maintenance and “fuel” replenishment. Humans have basic requirements to sustain health 
and life; these include water, food and sleep. Absence of any of these three basic 
requirements for a prolonged period of time will result in death. If these basic 
requirements are insufficient over a shorter period of time, the humans will no longer 
function at expected levels. When manpower levels are reduced so that there is little to no 
redundancy, there is risk to both personnel and mission. It is essential to understand 
human performance factors (and the limitations thereof) and to implement policies that 
protect personnel from debilitating effects of illness, injury and fatigue. 
1. Sleep 
Sleep is a natural bodily function; its complete purpose, however, still remains 
somewhat of a biological mystery. As such, the complete link between sleep and health  
is not yet fully understood. Although the benefits are not yet fully understood, the 
negative consequences of partial or total sleep deprivation are well documented. Lack of 
sleep contributes to poor performance and poor health. Job errors and accidents, as well 
as many health-related illnesses such as obesity, diabetes, and immune system 
dysfunction are linked to a lack of sufficient sleep (Lambert, 2005). Human performance 
and productivity degradation results from sleep deprivation. Scientific studies have 
demonstrated that sustained wakefulness in the range of 17–24 hours produces a 
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psychomotor deficit equivalent to the performance of an individual with a blood alcohol 
concentration (BAC) of 0.05% to 0.10% (Dawson & Reid, 1997).  
When the human body is asleep, many important restorative functions occur. 
Sleep is essential to the replenishment of energy and brain processes. Multiple studies 
found significant impairments in brain functions such as memory, vigilance, cognitive 
speed, spatial orientation, and motor control in individuals subjected to total sleep 
deprivation lasting longer than a day or partial sleep deprivation over a few days 
(Belenky et al., 1994; Horne & Pettitt, 1985; Krueger, 1989; Lorenzo et al., 1995; Rogers 
et al., 2003). It is sleep deprivation studies in rats, however, that provides some of the 
most compelling evidence supporting the importance of sleep. The normal life span of a 
rat is 2–3 years, but “rats deprived of Rapid Eye Movement (REM) sleep survive an 
average of only five months. Rats deprived of all sleep survive only about three weeks” 
(NHLBI, 2013, para. 3.8). These experiments with animal models expose the clear link 
between sleep and health; as do rats and all other mammals, humans require sleep to live.  
Sleep is an active process. There are five stages of sleep and the body will 
undergo each stage multiple times during a normal 8-hour sleep period. Figure 3  
displays the sequence humans undergo during a typical 8-hour sleep period. Sleep is 
divided into two basic categories: non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep and rapid eye 
movement (REM) sleep. Sleep begins in stage one and progresses to stage four, after 
which stages three and two are repeated and the body then enters the last stage (REM). 
Body temperature drops and heart rate slows in stage two and the body enters deep  
sleep in stage three. The brain is extremely active throughout each stage and brain 
activity will change with each sleep stage. In REM sleep, brain activity is highest. 
Typically, after REM is complete the body falls back into stage two sleep and the process 
repeats until waking. 
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Figure 3.  Sleep stages over a customary 8-hour sleep period  
(from Atranik, 2013a) 
The quantity of sleep that a person requires varies throughout life. Figure 4 shows 
how sleep patterns change from fragmented sleep in infants, to sleeping through the night 
with short afternoon naps in the toddler years. Young adults need significantly more sleep 
than adults; studies indicate young adults are shown to need 8.5 to 9.25 hours of sleep 
nightly (Miller & Shattuck, 2005), and approximately .5 to 1.25 more hours per night 
than the average 25-year-old (Carskadon et al., 1995; Wolfson & Carskadon, 1998, 
2003). According to the Defense Manpower Data Center Active Duty Personnel Master 
File, in 2011 the U.S. Navy employed 128,210 active-duty enlisted under the age of  
25 (DUSD(C&PP), 2012). Approximately 49.3%of all enlisted active-duty personnel are 
under the age of 25 (DUSD(C&PP), 2012). As these scientific studies show, the amount 
of rest that a sailor receives is extremely important to health and performance and varies 
significantly with age. When calculating the sleep deficit of members of the military, the 
distributions of age is an important factor to consider since these young junior enlisted 
and junior officers may fall into the adolescent/young adult sleep category and may 




Figure 4.  Lifespan sleep patterns (from Miller & Firehammer, 2007)  
Navy sailors are allotted 8 hours of rest per day, as specified by the NSWW. 
Many studies, however, have determined sailors are getting significantly less than 8 hours 
of sleep when at sea (Haynes, 2007; Green, 2009; Mason, 2009). According to self-
reported sleep data gathered over a three-month period by CNA, the core crew aboard 
LCS 1 averaged just 5.7 ± 1.2 hours of sleep per night during their first deployment; yet 
the crews considered this normal. CNA analysts also recognized that this average sleep 
amount dropped by .5-hour while underway; this finding was statistically significant at 
the 95% confidence level.  
Busy schedules and fragmented watch rotations are not the only challenges sailors 
face in their quest for sufficient rest. The ship environment has many factors that can 
affect a sailor’s ability to obtain restful sleep. Noise, smells, vibration, light, temperature 
changes, uncomfortable racks, and changes in sleeping surroundings all negatively 
impact sleep duration and quality (NHLBI, 2013, para. 4.0). Given the nature of military 
schedules and requirements, quality sleep is not always possible for many sailors.  
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2. Circadian Rhythms  
The body experiences a natural, sleep-wake cycle consisting of approximately  
8 hours of sleep and 16 hours of wakefulness under normal conditions every 24 to  
25 hours. The onset of sleep is controlled by a combination of two physiological and 
neurological functions in the body: sleep homeostasis and circadian rhythm.  
The homeostatic process is entirely physiological. A person will naturally become 
more tired the longer they are awake regardless of external conditions due to a sleep-
inducing chemical called adenosine. From the moment a person wakes, the body is 
creating adenosine and the more it builds the more difficult it becomes to stay awake. 
Eventually, the body will no longer be able to resist this build up and will succumb to 
sleep. An internal “clock,” along with external factors, drives an individual’s circadian 
rhythm. Circadian rhythms can be described as the physical, mental, and behavioral 
changes the body undergoes under a 24- to 25-hour period. A properly functioning 
circadian rhythm is extremely important to physical and mental health. Research shows 
that irregular circadian rhythms are associated with obesity, diabetes, depression, bipolar 
disorder, and seasonal affective disorder (Boden, Chen, & Urbain, 1996; Foy, 2010; 
Germain & Kupfer 2008; Rosenthal et al., 1984; Wittke-Thompson et al., 2008). The 
body’s natural circadian rhythm endeavors to keep a person awake as long as there is 
daylight, and because the circadian process is highly evolved, it is highly resistant to 
change. 
The hypothalamus of the brain contains an area called the suprachiasmatic 
nucleus (SCN). The SCN is responsible for “setting” the body’s circadian clock based on 
internal and external factors, and then mediates hormonal and temperature changes 
designed to induce sleep in the body based on these internal or endogenous cues. External 
factors or exogenous cues, such as light, meals, exercise, and the 24-hour day followed 
by society all help entrain the body’s natural circadian rhythm. The largest influences are 
the daylight/darkness cycle and a person’s work/social schedule (National Sleep 
Foundation, 2006). Internally, even without these external cues, the body will naturally 
follow a 24- to 25-hour innate clock (Horne, 1988).   
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Figure 5 shows a typical circadian rhythm experienced by an adult human over a 
sleep/wake cycle of 24–25 hours. Early in the morning, the body’s metabolism increases, 
the body naturally awakens, and the SCN ceases melatonin secretion. The body 
experiences a series of peaks and lulls in alertness throughout the afternoon until  
evening. As darkness sets in, the optic nerves sense the lack of light and send this 
information to the SCN causing it to again secret melatonin. The body sleeps, and the 
process begins anew.  
 
Figure 5.  The body’s 24- to 25-hour circadian rhythm  
(from Antranik, 2013b) 
The natural circadian process for humans is to stay awake during daylight, and to 
sleep with the onset of darkness. If the circadian rhythm is out of synchronization, sleep 
disruption can occur and health-related issues may also arise because the human body 
simply does not handle disruptions to this cycle well. A perfect example of this is when a 
body adjusts to crossing multiple time zones. Desynchronosis (“jetlag”) occurs when the 
normal light/dark schedule that a person has grown accustomed to changes. Shift 
workers, individuals working other than a 9 to 5 schedule, show similarities to persons 
affected by jetlag (Waterhouse, 1999).  
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3. Shiftwork 
Shiftwork is found in any organization that must operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a 
week, and exists extensively in both the civilian sector and the military community. The 
term “shiftwork” refers to two or more groups of people working a range of hours that 
enables an operation to extend beyond the normal operating hours of human capacity 
(Harrington, 2001). Shiftwork has been employed by a number of industries for decades 
because it allows for continuous coverage of necessary activities and one in five civilians 
are now subjected to this type of work schedule (Monk, 2012). Nurses, firefighters, 
police officers, airline pilots and flight attendants, military members, etc., are all 
considered shift workers. The Navy surface warfare community has one of the greatest 
exposures to shiftwork. Afloat, the community employs day and night watch rotations in 
order to conduct continuous operations. Despite the organizational benefits of shiftwork, 
advancement in sleep-related knowledge continues to shed new light on the practice, and 
the harmful effects it has on human health.   
Shiftwork disrupts a worker’s circadian rhythm, builds an unhealthy sleep deficit, 
and increases fatigue, leading to workplace inefficiency (Harrington, 2001). A person 
exposed to shiftwork experiences changes to their sleeping, eating, and working habits 
that then changes their body temperature peak times, respiratory rate, and hormone 
production (Harrington, 2001). When a person is rotated from day to night and vice versa 
on a daily or weekly basis, that person suffers degradation in health, performance, and 
effectiveness. Night shift workers display the most concerning effects; a medical 
diagnosis of shift work disorder, or SWD is identified by the cluster of symptoms they 
commonly experience.   
The natural human tendency is to sleep at night because of natural cues for 
wakefulness during the day (e.g., light, social schedules, work schedules, circadian 
rhythms). For night shift workers, however, the quality and quantity of sleep obtained 
during daylight hours is often not sufficient to return the body to an acceptable 
performance state. Studies show that night shift workers receive on average 1–4 hours 
less sleep than day workers (Akerstedt, 1990). Furthermore, night shiftwork exposure has 
been associated with poor sleep in retired seniors 65 years old and older, compared to 
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retired day workers from the same age group (Monk, 2012). High operational tempos and 
deployment schedules virtually guarantee that sailors will be exposed to the harmful 
health effects of shiftwork and night shiftwork.  
4. Fatigue 
The Oxford English Dictionary (2014) defines fatigue as “extreme tiredness.” 
Fatigue resulting from physical exertion and mental fatigue are the two most familiar 
types of fatigue. Mental fatigue is when one feels sleepy and is unable to focus or 
concentrate and is used to describe a more long-term or chronic state of tiredness. The 
limitations of the human body make fatigue extremely common, especially in taxing jobs 
like those of today’s sailors.  
Regardless of how many hours, days, weeks, or months they must work, military 
members are required to perform until the mission is done. Studies show, however, that 
excessive fatigue can negatively affect cognitive performance and lead to reduced 
reaction times and decreased vigilance (Krueger, 1989). Persistent fatigue can negatively 
affect personnel and team performance, mission accomplishment, safety, and morale. An 
environment of sustained work, fatigue, and sleep loss can create harmful physiological 
and psychological effects that negatively impact individual performance (Krueger, 1989). 
Impaired logical reasoning, vigilance, attention, mental tasks, reaction times, and 
situational awareness all can be negative effects of fatigue (Dinges et al., 1997; Belenky 
et al., 2003; Krueger, 1989). Studies show human cognitive performance is closely linked 
to quality and quantity of sleep (Mullaney, Kripke, & Fleck, 1989); by far the biggest 
contributor to fatigue is lack of sleep.  
Chronic sleep restriction directly affects an individual’s cognitive abilities, and 
the longer the sleep debt the longer an individual will take to recover full cognitive 
ability. Figure 6 shows a depiction of a study that was done to assess daytime 
performance changes as a result of chronic sleep restriction or augmentation, and 
subsequent recovery sleep. Referred to as the Walter Reed Restricted Sleep Study, three 
groups of individuals were restricted to either 3, 5, 7, or 9 hours of sleep for 1 week, 
followed by three days recovery of 8 hours rest per 24 hours. The graph shows the 
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performance of the individuals as measured by a psychomotor vigilance task (PVT) 
assessment. The PVT measures simple reaction time to a visual stimulus. The 3-hour 
group’s performance increases rapidly after 1 night of recovery. But, the 3-hour group 
only reaches a level consistent with the 5- and 7-hour groups despite 2 more nights of 
recovery. The 5- and 7-hour groups are able to recover slightly with 1 night of recovery; 
they never reach the performance displayed by the 9-hour group, however. The 9-hour 
group’s performance remains consistently high. These results show conclusively that 
restricted sleep limits brain operational capacity and that the problem persists even after 
normal sleep is restored (Belenky et al., 2003). As this study shows, a human being is not 
restored to a level of full alertness even with subsequent sleep when their fatigue is the 
result of a sleep deprivation pattern.  
 
Figure 6.  PVT speed test results of 3-, 5-, 7-, and 9-hour groups  
(from Belenky et al., 2003)  
C. WATCH-STANDING SCHEDULES 
Watch standing is a very important duty performed by Navy sailors. Maintaining 
a professional, vigilant watch rotation is vital to keeping the ship safe and in good 
working order. Every naval ship employs watch schedules that operate continuously  
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24 hours a day, 7 days a week. A sailor’s watch duties can range from monitoring 
equipment to carrying a weapon during force protection watches. There are many 
different watch-section combinations a ship can employ, but the most common watch 
schedules are two-section, three-section, and four-section.  
Two-section watch schedules are employed when there is a shortage of qualified 
personnel to stand watch, or there are just simply not enough personnel to allow a watch 
schedule with more sections. A two-section watch rotation, also referred to as a “port and 
starboard,” can be set up as a fixed rotation as shown in Table 1, or “dogged” rotation as 
shown in Table 2. On a fixed rotation, sailors stand the same watch every day, as shown 
in Table 1. On the two-section “dogged” rotation shown in Table 2, sailors stand a 
different watch by shifting their watch rotation forward. For example, if they stand the 
0600–1200 section watch today, tomorrow they will stand the 1200–1800 section watch. 
On the two-section “dogged” watch, the evening sections last only 3 hours.  
 
Table 1.   Two-section watch  
 
 
Table 2.   Two-section watch “dogged” 
Perhaps the most typical three-section watch rotation used in the U.S. Navy is 
referred to as “five and dimes,” as shown in Table 3. Sailors are on watch for 5 hours and 
off for 10 hours. Unlike the straight two-section watch, the three-section rotation equates 
to a 30-hour day, versus a 24-hour day in the two-section watch.  
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Table 3.   Three-section watch 
On the four-section watch schedule, as shown in Table 4, sailors stand watch for  
5 hours and are then off for 15 hours. This watch rotation rotates and sailors stand a 
different section watch each day. The four-section equates with a 20-hour day.  
 
Table 4.   Four-section watch 
Not having enough qualified personnel to stand watch is an issue that ship crews 
encounter on a regular basis. If only a small number of personal are qualified to stand 
watch, the number of watch “sections” a watch schedule can have is limited. The Navy 
does not regulate how many watch sections a ship is required to have, but rather regulates 
that sailors maintain a professional and vigilant watch. OPNAVINST 1000.16K states, 
“To reduce the total number of hours personnel are required to be on board for work and 
duty, commanding officers shall maintain the maximum feasible number of duty 
sections” (Appendix C, C-1). Ship departments, however, employ the watch rotation that 
best fits the number of qualified people available, or commanding officers will simply 
choose one section over another.   
D. IMPRINT PRO FORCES 
IMPRINT is a stochastic simulation software program used to support manpower 
and personnel integration within military weapons systems. It was originally used for 
Army human systems integration (HSI) and Army manpower and personnel integration 
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(MANPRINT) efforts. Developed by Alion Science and Technology and the Army 
Research Laboratory (ARL) Human Research and Engineering Directorate (HRED), 
IMPRINT is a dynamic, stochastic, and discrete event network and modeling tool that 
uses the Windows operating system. IMPRINT software was originally designed for 
Army use although the U.S. Navy has contributed support for further development of 
IMPRINT. There was a version of IMPRINT designed specifically for the U.S. Air 
Force. The newly expanded IMPRINT Pro, however, is now used by all branches of the 
military.  
IMPRINT Pro has the capability to assist in identifying manpower constraints in a 
system by assessing manpower requirements or the limitations of available manpower 
early in the systems acquisition process. IMPRINT Pro evaluates the manpower and 
personnel needed to effectively operate and maintain a system using task analysis, 
workload modeling, and embedded personnel characteristics; it does this through the use 
of four modules: Mission, Equipment, Warfighter, and Forces (IMPRINT, 2013b). Each 
IMPRINT Pro module features a unique graphical user interface and is a stand-alone 
package that allows the user to model discrete, dynamic, and/or stochastic events as 
appropriate for specific mission, equipment, or manpower analysis (IMPRINT, 2013c). 
When used together or individually, these modules provide estimations of manpower, 
personnel, and training (MPT) requirements and constraints for a range of systems.  
The Army has used IMPRINT Pro software to determine operator workload and 
manning levels, and analysts have successfully used the IMPRINT Pro Mission, 
Warfighter, and Forces modules to conduct human performance analyses. These modules 
have potential use in Navy fleet manpower determination processes. Each IMPRINT Pro 
module produces its own data outputs in the form of Excel spreadsheets, charts, and 
graphs that allow analysts to evaluate system performance and personnel availability an 
capability. These data outputs are then used to create a more accurate prediction of the 
manpower estimates for successful system operation and maintenance according to 
established standards. The IMPRINT Pro Forces module provides information outputs to 
accurately estimate the effects of manpower changes on planned and unplanned work 
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before system implementation or may be used to refine manpower estimates after the 
system is in place.   
The IMPRINT Pro Forces module estimates the feasibility of mission 
accomplishment with the manpower assigned to a unit. It is able to predict how a unit 
will perform with additions or reductions of personnel and how changing manning 
impacts mission capability and crew performance. Specifically, the Forces module 
assesses a unit’s response to planned activities and unplanned events based on different 
manpower levels. (Planned events are events that the unit expects to complete on a daily 
basis whereas unplanned events are either emergencies or events that interrupt daily 
planned activities and must be resolved.) 
The Forces module represents the actual workings of a unit and can be divided 
into two categories: activities and jobs. Activities are tasks performed by the force unit 
while jobs are the people who perform and accomplish those activities. Once a model is 
built and run, Forces uses a stochastic simulation engine to simulate the baseline 
utilization of all jobs in various activities according to the schedules defined over a 
designated period of time (IMPRINT, 2013a). The module also simulates in parallel the 
defined unplanned events that are designed to disrupt these ongoing activities (IMPRINT, 
2013). The data spreadsheets generated from this simulation forecast the performance and 
effectiveness of a unit by showing the unit’s capability to address events over a length of 
time specified (IMPRINT, 2013a). The Forces module can thus determine how well a 
unit addressed planned activities and unplanned events encountered over an established 
period of time by showing whether that event failed, how long before the activity or event 
failed, and why the activity or event failed. By analyzing these outputs, manpower 
discrepancies can be identified and quantified by the number of failures that occur when 
the model is changed to different levels of manpower or different skill sets. 
E. FAST AND THE SAFTE MODEL 
FAST is a software program that uses the SAFTE model to predict and analyze an 
individual’s cognitive effectiveness based on their sleep and work schedule over a 
specified period of time. The DoD-developed SAFTE model has been scrutinized closely 
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under scientific review (Hursh, Balkin, Miller, & Eddy, 2004); the DoD considers 
SAFTE to be their model of choice since it has less error compared to other developed 
models. The SAFTE model is based on 20 years of sleep and circadian rhythm research, 
and shows accurate and validated predictions of worker performance as a function of 
actual or simulated sleep data, work schedules, rest periods, and travel periods. The 
SAFTE model can accurately predict cognitive performance by using information from 
an individual’s actual or hypothetical sleep/wake cycle and work schedule (Hursh et al., 
2004). This prediction is then displayed through the user-friendly FAST program.  
The SAFTE model is the foundation of the FAST software and it is what gives 
FAST such accurate outputs. Figure 7 shows a typical FAST display output for an 
individual over a period of time. The Windows-based FAST graphically displays 
cognitive performance predictions during an individual’s schedule. FAST is used 
specifically to find weaknesses and vulnerabilities in current schedules and allows 
schedules to be changed easily or modified in order to identify optimized schedules, 
given operational constraints. FAST uses work schedules and sleep data and factors in the 
circadian process, sleep propensity, and sleep fragmentation to display changes in an 
individual’s cognitive performance and provide an estimation of future performance.  
 
Figure 7.  FAST graphical results of an individual on a three-section watch 
rotation (“five and dimes”) 
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The DoD considers FAST a critical aid in operator scheduling. The U.S. Air 
Force and U.S. Army have successfully used the FAST software tool operationally. The 
Air Force uses FAST to determine aviation schedules that ensure crews are sufficiently 
rested for the entire mission; thus creating an optimal schedule that can offer a safer crew 
environment. The Navy also has areas that warrant the use of FAST to include the Naval 
Safety Center that mandates that all naval mishap investigations apply FAST to the 
mishap findings. If used correctly, FAST can help assess alertness during mission-critical 
tasks, reduce fatigue-related errors, and help to ensure the health of military members. 
F. OTHER HUMAN PERFORMANCE MODELING TOOLS 
Using human performance software programs such as IMPRINT Pro and FAST in 
the fleet manpower determination process is a way to obtain more accurate manpower 
requirements estimations and determine better watch schedules for crews. The Ship 
Manpower Requirements and Analysis Tool (SMART), the Total Crew Model (TCM), 
and the IMPRINT Pro Mission module are all examples of human performance software 
tools that were considered as potential alternatives to using the IMPRINT Pro Forces 
module to evaluate the LCS manning levels for this case study.  
SMART is a manpower prediction tool and, like IMPRINT Pro, was developed by 
Alion Science and Technology. SMART was developed for the Office of Naval Research 
(ONR) and the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) to help analyze manpower 
requirements and automation of equipment prior to new technology implementation. 
SMART and IMPRINT Pro were both built to be used early in the acquisition process so 
that costly mistakes could be avoided. SMART is designed to analyze automation and 
manpower together and is typically used before automated systems are integrated. For the 
current thesis, SMART was not used because the system (in this case, LCS) was already 
in operation and this case study dealt primarily with manpower levels. 
Also developed by Alion Science and Technology, TCM concentrates on the 
performance of the unit as a whole and results are based heavily on the NSWW for naval 
applications. While TCM analyzes time limits and has a daily schedule interrupted by 
unplanned events, its analysis on a less refined scale as that in IMPRINT Pro Forces. The 
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IMPRINT Pro Forces module focuses on time attributes to determine manpower 
requirements based solely on response time and how long planned activities and 
unplanned events take to complete. TCM, however, answers whether the crew can 
successfully complete all missions within a certain amount of fatigue. TCM is labor-
intensive to populate the data sets and analyze; in addition, it has not been updated to run 
on more recent computer operating systems. Consequently, TCM is no longer used and 
IMPRINT Forces was designed to be its replacement. IMPRINT Pro Forces has elements 
of TCM incorporated into its design, allowing Forces to offer many of the same 
capabilities as TCM, but in a more user-friendly software program.  
The IMPRINT Pro Mission module concentrates on a smaller portion of a unit, 
such as a department or division. The results of the Mission module answer whether the 
workload of that crew is too high. The goal of the Mission module is to determine 
manpower performance along with system performance. Since the Mission module did 
not have the capability to model or evaluate the performance of an entire ship crew 
collectively, the IMPRINT Pro Mission module was not used in this thesis. IMPRINT 
Pro Forces was selected because it is more flexible  and capable of handling a more 
diverse set of manpower analyses, such as comparing ship crew sizes. Before this thesis, 
the IMPRINT Pro Forces program had not been utilized for ship manpower 




A. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW 
This thesis is an LCS manpower case study encompassing three related but 
distinctly different efforts. These efforts include (1) the IMPRINT Pro Forces module,  
(2) the FAST/SAFTE model, and (3) a survey administered to current crewmembers 
aboard LCS 2. The objective of this case study is to assess the use of human performance 
software to validate manpower requirements. More specifically, it assesses the 
applicability of IMPRINT Pro Forces in determining manning levels early in program 
development. Theoretically, human performance software should provide more accurate 
estimates of ship manpower and help prevent some of the inevitable consequences that 
often occur when manpower requirements for new acquisitions and existing platforms are 
determined.   
Part one of the methodology describes how each of the three IMPRINT Pro 
Forces models was built for a notional LCS operational underway period. Part two of the 
methodology describes how notional watch schedules were modeled using FAST, which 
uses the SAFTE model to predict individual effectiveness levels utilizing work and sleep 
data. While actual sleep data were not collected from LCS crews for this analysis, the 
authors used FAST to show how an individual’s cognitive effectiveness varies depending 
on the 72-hour the sleep history. Part three discusses the development, administration and 
analysis of a survey administered to the crew of the USS INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2) to 
elicit feedback on current watch rotations, allotted manpower, and daily operational 
requirements in order to determine whether the IMPRINT Pro Forces and FAST model 
outputs reflect the crewmembers’ perceptions of their current manning levels. 
B. IMPRINT PRO FORCES MODULE METHODS 
1. IMPRINT Model Overview 
The IMPRINT Pro Forces Module is designed specifically to determine a unit’s 
manpower requirements and may be useful in determining a surface ship’s manpower 
requirement. It can reveal inadequacies in a unit’s assigned personnel by revealing how 
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many planned activities and unplanned events fail due to lack of required personnel for 
the planned activity or unplanned event.  
Three different IMPRINT models were built using three different LCS enlisted 
core crew sizes (i.e., 31, 40, and 48, which correspond to total core crew of 40, 50 and 
60) to determine which crew size showed the fewest failures of planned activities and 
unplanned events during a typical underway period. The planned activities and unplanned 
events were scripted by the authors and then refined using input from a veteran LCS 
Operations Officer, LCDR Matthew L. Muehlbauer, USN. The first model (enlisted core 
crew of 31) was built to reflect both the current USS Independence (LCS 2) configuration 
and the initial enlisted manning estimates for LCS. The second model (enlisted core crew 
of 40) reflects the current USS Freedom (LCS 1) enlisted manpower level with the 
additional nine enlisted sailors “plus up.” The third model (enlisted core crew of 48) was 
built to obtain comparative data on a notional LCS core crew of 60 sailors (assuming a 
core crew of 48 enlisted and 12 officers). To get this third condition with the notional 
enlisted core crew of 48, two enlisted sailors were added to each of the four LCS 
departments (i.e., Engineering, Combat Systems, Supply, and Operations). 
2. Model Objective 
The objective of the IMPRINT model is to assess the following questions: Can 
the IMPRINT Pro Forces module be used to determine manpower requirements for an 
LCS Force unit? Can the LCS enlisted core crew size of 31, 40, and/or 48 provide 
adequate manning to successfully complete all planned activities and unplanned events 
during a 21-day underway period? What differences, if any, are detected in failures 
between the three different manning levels? 
3. Inputs to the Model 
The data used to generate the IMPRINT Pro models was collected from multiple 
sources. The Center of Naval Analysis (CNA) supplied cards, in the form of excel 
spreadsheets, of data they gathered from the USS Freedom (LCS 1) deployment to 
Singapore March 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013 with Blue Crew 101 and Gold Crew 102. 
This case study only used the underway data for LCS 1 Blue Crew due to incomplete data 
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in several critical categories from the Gold Crew. In-port data was also excluded because 
USN ship manpower estimates are determined solely using at-sea workload (afloat 
workweek) and an LCS crew would be able to utilize shore support during in-port 
periods. The afloat workweek assumes an autonomous unit steaming in Condition III 
(wartime/deployed cruising readiness) on a three-section watch basis. The watch 
configurations for the IMPRINT Pro models included three-section watch rotations for 
the 31 and 40 enlisted core crew models and a four-section watch rotation for the  
48 enlisted core crew model. Due to manning limitations, the enlisted core crews of  
31 and 40 did not have enough personnel for a four-section watch rotation in all 
departments. The notional crew of 48 (total crew size of 60) does allow for a four-section 
watch rotation in all four departments. 
The CNA data cards, shown in Figure 8, display a snapshot of all sailors onboard 
LCS 1, alphabetically and by rate, during deployed, underway periods.  
 
Figure 8.  Snapshot of LCS 1 data cards  
(from Center of Naval Analysis, 2013) 
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The CNA data cards were completed daily by crewmembers. The information on 
the data cards was divided into several categories including the following (Figure 9): 
 
Figure 9.  CNA data card categories 
Inputs to the IMPRINT Pro models required detailed knowledge of underway 
shipboard activities for planned activities and unplanned events, to include duration  
and timing of each event. Crew feedback, in the form of a survey administered to crew 
members of the USS Independence (LCS 2), served to correct inaccuracies and  
update model inputs. This information was compiled and then submitted to current LCS 
operations officer, LCDR Matthew L. Muehlbauer, USN, for external verification  
and validation. 
4. IMPRINT Pro Forces Model Design 
An eight-step process was used to create each of the IMPRINT Pro Forces 
models. These steps are (1) define the force unit of interest, (2) develop a list of planned 
activities to be performed by the force unit, (3) develop a list of unplanned events to be 
performed by the force unit, (4) define schedules for the force unit, (5) develop a list of 
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jobs comprising the force unit, (6) assign roles to the jobs, (7) set the Activities Trump 
Matrix, and (8) run the Force Analysis model to generate reports. 
To define the force unit in step 1, the LCS Activities Manpower Document 
(AMD), discussed in Chapter II of the Literature Review on the Fleet Manpower 
Determination Process, was used to describe each rate for the original LCS enlisted core 
crew. Model 1, the core crew model with 31 enlisted sailors, reflected the original AMD 
for both variants of LCS, which reflects the current enlisted core crew on the USS 
Independence (LCS 2). Model 2, the core crew model with 40 enlisted sailors, was 
modeled after the data taken from the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) documenting the 
“plus up” of nine enlisted sailors aboard the USS Freedom (LCS 1) during the 2013 
deployment to Singapore. Model 3, the core crew model with 48 enlisted sailors, was 
built with two enlisted sailors added to each of the four departments on LCS to reflect a 
notional enlisted core crew size of 60 (i.e., 48 enlisted sailors and 12 officers).  
 Step 2, developing a list of planned activities, entailed creating schedules for the 
crew based on watch rotation (either two- or three-section watchbill) and typical events 
encountered on a daily basis aboard the LCS. Each model was built as a deployed unit 
steaming in Condition III, using either a three-section “five and dime” or four-section 
watch rotation for a total of 21 days. Since some LCS watch stations are not able to 
support a three-section watch rotation due to the limited number of qualified personnel 
available in the 31 and 42 enlisted core crew models, a two-section watch rotation was 
created to supplement as shown in Figure 10. For all three models, schedules were also 
created for those personnel who do not stand watch.  
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Figure 10.  Snapshot of LCS 1 watch schedules 
Steps 2 and 3 required a list of planned activities and unplanned events to be 
developed to simulate what events a unit would potentially encounter during a 21-day 
underway. The red blocks in Figure 11 show those planned activities the crew is expected 
to complete daily, such as standing watch, training, personal hygiene, sleeping, and 
eating. The unplanned events are represented by the yellow tags in Figure 11 and 
represent emergencies that disrupt the daily routine. The planned activities are scheduled 
with start and end times, while the unplanned events have randomized start times.  
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Figure 11.  Planned and unplanned activities 
Figure 12 shows the attributes of an unplanned event that are captured in the 
IMPRINT Tool. The example illustrated is for a shipboard fire, just one possible 
unplanned event that could occur during a typical underway period.  
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Figure 12.  Attributes of an unplanned fire 
The attributes of unplanned events have the following fields:  
 Sleep activity 
 Interrupt strategy 
 Job roles 
 Adding crew members 
 Start 
 Duration 
 Repeat times 
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The interrupt strategy allows the user to set the priority of an activity or event if 
the personnel required for the planned activity or event are taken up by a higher priority. 
Job roles are positions that respond to the planned activity or unplanned event and also 
display how many people are required and desired. The start time is the day and time 
when the planned activity or unplanned event should start, followed by the duration, 
which is the expected duration of the activity or event, and ending with the repeat time, 
which is the interval at which this activity or event repeats. All times entered are based on 
a mean and standard deviation so that there is variation in the models.  
Step 4 requires a schedule to be defined for each core crewmember. Defining the 
schedule is a critical part of the IMPRINT modeling process because the simulated 
sailors in each of their jobs will follow this schedule when the model simulation is run. 
All daily, planned activities used to define schedules were entered based on the CNA data 
cards collected during the 2013 underway. These were reviewed and refined by actual 
LCS crewmember (LCDR Matthew L. Muehlbauer, USN), and the prior experience of 
LT Hollins, a qualified Surface Warfare Officer. The following assumptions were made 
for certain aspects of each schedule for all three models: 
 One hour of personal time was given following lunch and dinner 
 Thirty minutes was allotted for each meal 
 No work was conducted between the hours of 1800 and 0600 
 Conventional Navy watchbills were used for both two-, three-, and four-
section watches (port and starboard 6/6, five and dimes 5/10, and 5/15). 
Figure 13 shows a snapshot of a daily schedule for the first watch section in a 
three-watch rotation. Each of the other watch sections had similar daily schedules, 




Figure 13.  Daily work schedule for watch section 1 of 3 
Once the planned activities and unplanned events were defined, a list of jobs for 
each unit was created. The sailors in this model were assigned jobs based on their 
military occupational specialty as shown in Figure 14. This job assignment was based on 
the CNA data cards and the LCS 2 AMD which listed the required personnel needed to 
fill the jobs in each model. Once the jobs were defined, job roles were assigned. Job roles 
are the specific positions filled by the sailors. Data collected by CNA and feedback that 
was solicited from LCS 2 crewmembers were the sources of information used to assign 
roles to each sailor in each of the three models.  
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Figure 14.  List of jobs  
During the simulation, many activities are initiated at the same time, but since the 
number of sailors is limited, sailors can only perform one activity at a time according to 
the Activity Trump Matrix. Step 7 sets up the Activities Trump Matrix, and is a critical 
step because it establishes the priority in which planned activities and unplanned events 
are engaged, ensuring that the sailors are addressing more important activities or events 
first. If a sailor is assigned more than one activity or event at a time, the activity or event 
with a higher priority will be addressed first. Figure 15 displays the trump matrix used in 
each model. For example, if a sailor is sleeping and a fire starts, the sailor will wake up 
and engage the fire if they are assigned to a job role that responds to fires. Likewise, if a 
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sailor is eating and flight quarters is called, the sailor will stop eating and attend flight 
quarters if they are assigned to a job role that responds to flight quarters. The same 
Activity Trump Matrix was used for each model. 
 
Figure 15.  Activities Trump Matrix 
In step 8, the authors ran 100 iterations of each of the three core crew model 
simulations. The outputs from all of these simulated runs were exported into Excel 
spreadsheets by the IMPRINT Pro Forces module. The execution setting for this case 
study was set to 21 days in length. This setting was selected because, according to 
OPNAVINST 3501.352 (a rough draft of the LCS ROC/POE), the LCS maximum 
expected crew endurance for Condition III steaming is 21 consecutive days, with the 
opportunity for 8 hours of rest per crewmember per day. 
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For each model, the same random seed number (RSN) was used for all three 
models during the first run; for each subsequent run, a different RSN was used for all 
three models. For example, the first run for each model used the RSN of 1. The second 
run of all three models used a different RSN than that used in run one but again, the RSN 
was set the same for all three models. The RSN was different for each of the 100 runs to 
simulate model variation in results.  
Upon successful completion of a run, IMPRINT Pro generated a number of pre-
selected reports as shown in Figure 16. The Unplanned Activity Status report, shown in 
Figure 17, was the primary report used for this case study since it provides information 
on how many planned activities or unplanned events failed within a specified time period 
and what specific job roles failed to complete the activity or event.  
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Figure 16.  Display of execution settings and reports selection tables 
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Figure 17.  Unplanned activity status report 
C. FATIGUE AVOIDANCE SCHEDULING TOOL METHOD 
1. Overview 
The FAST program was used in this study to predict cognitive effectiveness based 
on sleep and work patterns over a 21-day underway period. FAST calculates the impact 
that the 72-hour sleep history has on a given individual’s alertness and cognitive 
effectiveness at any point in the schedule. Actual sleep data from LCS crewmembers was 
not used in this thesis, but FAST also allows for analysis of manpower using both actual 
sleep data as well as notional data. 
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2. FAST Objectives 
FAST was utilized to help draw conclusions about the watch rotations used by 
LCS 1 and LCS 2. The IMPRINT Pro Forces module results do not show the 
effectiveness of the individual throughout a period of time. The objective of this case 
study, in regards to FAST, is to examine what effect sleep schedules and watch rotations 
used onboard the USS Freedom (LCS 1) and USS Independence (LCS 2) have on a 
sailor’s cognitive effectiveness, and to illustrate the expected individual effectiveness of a 
sailor. By using the watch and sleep schedules derived from the IMPRINT model 
simulations, FAST results give an approximation of the effectiveness level a sailor will 
experience when executing their daily activities and unplanned events. 
3. Data for FAST Input 
The FAST inputs for this case study were taken from watch rotations currently 
used afloat. Two-section, three-section, and four-section watch schedules were simulated 
using FAST. Three-section and four-section watch rotations are the most common in the 
fleet. Typically, a two-section watch rotation is used when a ship does not have the 
manpower support or does not have enough qualified sailors. FAST was also used to 
illustrate sleep and watch schedules depicted in the IMPRINT Pro Forces simulations. No 
actual sleep data were collected; all sleep and work intervals and watch rotations are 
notional.  
Using the results from the IMPRINT Pro Forces models, the sailor with the most 
sleep and the sailor with the least sleep was modeled in FAST using the watch and sleep 
times simulated by IMPRINT Pro Forces. First, a random model run was chosen from the 
100 simulations of each IMPRINT model (RSN 3). Then the sailor with the highest 
average sleep amount and the sailor with the least average sleep amount was chosen and 
their 21-day schedules were modeled in FAST. When imputing IMPRINT schedule data 
into FAST, a sailor was assumed to be working if free time was encountered between 
0600–1800. For example, if a sailor on a three-section watch rotation has just finished 
standing watch from 0200–0700, that sailor will then go to work. This situation is a 
typical occurrence during watch rotations while underway. The FAST outputs that 
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illustrate the most sleep amount and least sleep amount of an enlisted sailor found in each 
enlisted core crew model are shown in Figures 37 to 42, the FAST Results section of 
Chapter IV. 
4. FAST Schedule Design 
The first step in the FAST process is to enter the schedule properties, as shown in 
Figure 17, and enter the name of the schedule. For this case study, the name of the 
schedule is the actual watch rotation. The description box is not a required field. The next 
step involves filling in the descriptive information, such as when the schedule will start, 
the duration of the schedule, and the location. FAST is meant to supplement this case 
study by determining cognitive performance at the individual level; because LCS 1 data 
was collected while on deployment in Singapore, Singapore was the geographic location 
selected in FAST (as shown in Figure 18). Geographic location in FAST is important 
since it accounts for the actual times of sunrise and sunset, and provides insight into light 
cues and daylight savings time. 
 
Figure 18.  Edit schedule properties window 
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In the next step, the schedule information must be defined. FAST has two 
methods to accomplish this schedule definition. The two methods are the sleep and work 
interval table method (Figure 19) and the schedule grid method (Figure 20). Either 
method is effective since once you enter data using one of the methods, FAST 
automatically populates the other table. In this study, the schedule grid method was used 
to input work and sleep data. 
 
Figure 19.  Edit sleep and work intervals table 
 
Figure 20.  Schedule grid example 
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The final two steps of the FAST model setup involved editing the graphical 
display options and displaying the results. On the graphical display options table, there 
are four fields to populate: (1) time display, (2) scale minimum, (3) zone limits and 
criterion line, and (4) right axis scale. The time display offers the option of setting the 
time to local, Zulu, or a mission-specific time. The minimum scale field refers to the 
minimum value required on the Y-axis of the display, as shown in Figures 21 and 22. The 
zone limits and criterion line fields represent the ranges of performance and were left on 
the default settings provided in FAST.  
 
Figure 21.  Graphical display options 
In Figure 22, the horizontal green band at the top represents the predicted 
effectiveness of 90% or better. The performance of a person on a normal duty day with  
8 hours of excellent sleep would fall into this green band. The yellow band below the 
green band represents predicted effectiveness of 77.5–90%, a cautionary zone that 
indicates degraded performance. The red horizontal band represents predicted 
effectiveness levels less than 77.5% and also corresponds to the degraded vigilance 
performance common in a person who is severely sleep-deprived.  
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The vertical scale on the right axis scale has multiple metrics to display to depict 
how the individual is performing. Two of the more commonly used metrics are the lapse 
likelihood index and the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) scale. The BAC scale, seen 
on the right axis, was used in this study to show that, at certain periods, predicted 
effectiveness was equivalent to that of a person who is intoxicated. When all these fields 
are completed, FAST generates a graphical depiction of an individual’s cognitive 
performance for the specified period. 
 
Figure 22.  Example of graphical output of FAST 
D. SURVEY 
1. Overview 
As a final step in this thesis, a survey was developed to administer to LCS 
crewmembers to validate the inputs used for the IMPRINT models and to assess the 
validity of the IMPRINT and FAST results. The survey was designed specifically to 
validate the results of the IMPRINT and FAST models to see if crewmembers’ 
perceptions of departmental and individual workloads onboard LCS are reflected in the 
results of IMPRINT and FAST modeling efforts. This survey was important for two 
reasons: 1) it helped validate IMPRINT model inputs, such as watch rotations being used 
by departments onboard LCS; and 2) it allowed a comparison between the IMPRINT and 
FAST results and LCS sailor opinions. 
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2. Survey Objectives 
A survey was developed and administered to Crew 202/GOLD aboard the  
USS Independence (LCS 2) in January of 2014. A total of 33 LCS sailors completed this 
baseline survey of certain aspects of the LCS during an operational underway period. The 
survey was administered to solicit personal opinions about the current watch rotations 
being used, the relative workload of departments and for various shipboard positions, and 
the amount of sleep the current watch rotation permits. No identifying information was 
asked other than the sailors’ rate or rank. Participation was completely voluntary.  
3. Survey Respondents 
There were 33 survey respondents: 21 enlisted core crew, 3 core crew officers, 
and 9 non-core crew enlisted sailors. The total enlisted core crew aboard the USS 
Independence (LCS 2) was 32, and the total officer core crew was 8. Survey respondents 
represented 66% of the enlisted core crew and 38% of the officer core crew. Figures 23 




Figure 23.  Survey participants by rank 
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This chapter explains and displays the results of the methods described in Chapter 
III. Section A presents the analysis of the IMPRINT Pro Forces data that determines if 
there are significant differences in failures of unplanned events among the three crew 
sizes. Section B presents the results of the predicted cognitive effectiveness, as calculated 
in FAST, of LCS sailors on watch in two-, three-, and four-section watch rotations and 
sailor performance during the IMPRINT simulation schedules. Section C presents the 
results of the LCS survey administered to USS Independence (LCS 2) crew.  
A. IMPRINT PRO FORCES RESULTS 
Upon completion of each model simulation run, IMPRINT Pro Forces generated 
an unplanned activity status report. The report displayed the unplanned activities, 
simulation time, activity status, and the roles and features that were unmet. The data 
collected from the unplanned activity status reports was used to calculate the mean time 
between failures (MTBF) and the average failures per run for each unplanned activity, 
shown in Tables 5 and 6. Each of the models ran 100 times to total 300 reports. The 
results from the MTBF and the average failure per run were used to compare the three 
sizes of enlisted core crews (i.e., 31, 40, and 48). A minimum of two failures is required 
to calculate the MTBF; consequently, we were unable to calculate the MTBF and average 
number of failures per run for fire, flooding, and centrix failures because those events had 




Table 5.   Mean time between failures for unplanned events 
 
Table 6.   Average number of failures per run for unplanned events 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was conducted to determine statistically 
significant differences for each failed unplanned activity; then a Tukey Honestly 
Significant Difference (HSD) test was completed to determine where differences between 
core crews existed. The null hypothesis for this study stated that all the mean times 
between failures were the same for all three crew sizes; the alternative hypothesis 
assumed that two or more means were different from the others: 
H0: µ31 = µ40 = µ48, all the means are the same 




Table 7.   Tukey HSD test results 
In Figures 25–32, the bars indicate mean comparisons between the two enlisted 
core crews. The narrow lines indicate the confidence intervals. If the confidence intervals 
exclude zero (i.e., the confidence interval does not cross the x-axis), there is a significant 
difference between the two enlisted core crews. If the confidence interval includes zero 
(crosses the x-axis), there is no statistical difference between the enlisted core crews. For 
example, Figure 25 shows the Tukey results for the Link failures with significant 
differences between core crew 31 as compared to core crew sizes 40 and 48. However, 
core crew size 40 was not different from 48.  
(31,40) (40,48) (31,48)
LINK-16/NAVY RED Issues YES NO YES
Weapon System Misfire NO YES YES
Network Issues YES NO YES
RO Issues YES NO YES
MPDE Casualty NO YES YES
SSDG Casualty NO YES YES
VCHT Issues YES NO YES





Figure 25.  Link Tukey results 
 
 


























Figure 27.  Network Tukey results 
 
 











































Figure 29.  MPDE Tukey results 
 
 










































Figure 31.  VCHT Tukey results 
 
 
















































B. FAST RESULTS 
FAST was used in this study to predict individual cognitive effectiveness based 
on sleep and work activity patterns during a 21-day underway for typical watch rotations 
aboard LCS and to illustrate the most average sleep amount and least average sleep 
amount found in each of the three IMPRINT models. Figures 33 to 36 display the FAST 
graphs that illustrate the effects that sleep and watch rotations have on cognitive 
effectiveness and alertness. No actual sleep data were collected; the work intervals, watch 
rotations, and sleep epochs used in the FAST models were notional. Because the FAST 
schedules are notional, however, they represent a “best-case” scenario in which a sailor 
receives fair sleep for the entire 21-days: their sleep is uninterrupted, they are able to fall 
asleep within fifteen minutes of watch turnover after 1900 and only wake 30 minutes 
prior to morning watch. FAST was then used to illustrate the sleep and watch schedules 
from the IMPRINT Pro model simulations and an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test 
was conducted to determine statistically significant differences in the mean sleep total for 
each enlisted core crew. The FAST graphs illustrate the IMPRINT, 21-day underway 
sleep and watch schedule of each sailor. Figures 37 to 42 displays the FAST outputs that 
illustrate the most average sleep amount and least average sleep amount of an enlisted 
sailor found in each enlisted core crew model. 
1. Predicted Cognitive Effectiveness of a Notional Sailor on a Two-, 
Three- or Four-Section Watch Rotation 
Figure 33 shows the predicted effectiveness of a sailor on a 6/6 watch rotation, 
standing the same exact watch every day. After only five days, the sailor’s predicted 
effectiveness while on watch is below the 77.5% predicted effectiveness criterion line for 
the remainder of the time. The sailor’s reaction times are comparative to someone 
intoxicated at a .05 BAC level.  
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Figure 33.  Predicted effectiveness for a sailor on a  
6/6 (two-section) watch rotation 
Figure 34 shows the predicted effectiveness of a sailor on a 6/6 dogged watch 
rotation, standing a different watch every day but repeating the rotation every other day. 
The sailor’s predicted effectiveness while on watch falls in the red range below the 65% 
predicted effectiveness threshold for almost the entire time. FAST shows that the sailor’s 
predicted reaction times are severely impaired—comparable to the performance of an 
individual intoxicated at a .08 BAC level. It is important to point out that the simulated 
activities of certain crewmembers of the IMPRINT Model 1 (core crew of 31 enlisted 
sailors) and Model 2 (core crew of 40 enlisted sailors) were using this same port and 
starboard (6/6) schedule. 
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Figure 34.  Predicted effectiveness for a sailor on a  
6/6 (two-section) dogged watch rotation 
Figure 35 shows the predicted effectiveness of a sailor on a 5/10 watch rotation, 
standing a different watch every day but repeating the rotation every three days. This 
watch rotation was used in the IMPRINT Pro Forces for enlisted core crew 31 and 40. 
The sailor’s predicted effectiveness while on watch is on the border of the red and yellow 
ranges below the 77.5% predicted effectiveness criterion line 85% of the time. The 
sailor’s reaction times are predicted to be severely impaired—as if the sailor was 
intoxicated at a .08 BAC level. 
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Figure 35.  Predicted effectiveness for a sailor on a  
5/10 (three-section) watch rotation 
Figure 36 shows the predicted effectiveness of a sailor on a 5/15 watch rotation, 
standing a different watch every day but repeating the schedule every fourth day. The 
sailor’s predicted effectiveness while on watch is in the yellow range above the  
77.5% predicted effectiveness criterion line 80% of the time. The sailor’s reaction times 
are higher than the other conditions and the sailor experiences the marginally better 
predicted effectiveness because their sleep occurs at nearly the same time almost every 
night. Sleeping at the same time of night is important because doing so increases the 
chance of maintaining circadian rhythm synchronization. 
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Figure 36.  Predicted effectiveness for a sailor on a  
5/15 (four-section) watch rotation 
2. Analysis of Most and Least Average Sleep Totals  
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was conducted to determine statistically 
significant differences in the mean sleep total for each enlisted core crew. The null 
hypothesis for this analysis assumed that all the mean sleep totals between enlisted core 
crews were the same, and the alternative hypothesis assumed that one or more mean sleep 
totals were different from the others: 
H0: µ31 = µ40 = µ48, all the means are the same 
H1: µ31 ≠ µ40 ≠ µ48, one or more means are different 
The results of the ANOVA test showed no statistical significant difference  
(p > .05) in the mean sleep totals. Therefore, there is not sufficient evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis. The mean sleep totals may not be significantly different, but the FAST 
outputs display a different perspective. In Figures 37–42, the predicted effectiveness of 
the most average sleep totals and the least average sleep totals are displayed for each 
enlisted core crew. The sleep totals were taken from the activity data report with the same 
random seed number for each enlisted crew core. FAST can be used as a human 
performance prediction tool in conjunction with IMPRINT Pro Forces.   
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Figure 37 shows the predicted effectiveness of the sailor with the most average 
sleep total for the 31 enlisted core crew (40 core crew). The sailor has a mean 
effectiveness of 72% while on watch and 46% of the time the sailors predicted 
effectiveness falls below 70%.  
 
Figure 37.  Predicted effectiveness of the sailor with the most average sleep 
amount from the 31 enlisted core crew 
 Figure 37 shows the predicted effectiveness of the sailor with the least average 
sleep total for the 31 enlisted core crew (40 core crew). The sailor has a mean 
effectiveness of 66.17% while on watch and 78% of the time the sailors predicted 
effectiveness falls below 70%. 
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Figure 38.  Predicted effectiveness of the sailor with the least average sleep 
amount from the 31 enlisted core crew 
 Figure 39 shows the predicted effectiveness of the sailor with the most average 
sleep total for the 40 enlisted core crew (50 core crew). The sailor has a mean 
effectiveness of 71.22% while on watch and 41% of the time the sailors predicted 
effectiveness falls below 70%. 
 
Figure 39.  Predicted effectiveness of the sailor with the most average sleep 
amount from the 40 enlisted core crew 
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 Figure 40 shows the predicted effectiveness of the sailor with the least average 
sleep total for the 40 enlisted core crew (50 core crew). The sailor has a mean 
effectiveness of 66.25% while on watch and 64% of the time the sailors predicted 
effectiveness falls below 70%. 
 
Figure 40.  Predicted effectiveness of the sailor with the least average sleep 
amount from the 40 enlisted core crew 
 Figure 41 shows the predicted effectiveness of the sailor with the most average 
sleep total for the 48 enlisted core crew (60 core crew). The sailor has a mean 




Figure 41.  Predicted effectiveness of the sailor with the most average sleep 
amount from the 48 enlisted core crew 
 Figure 42 shows the predicted effectiveness of the sailor with the least average 
sleep total for the 48 enlisted core crew (60 core crew). The sailor has a mean 
effectiveness of 74.93% while on watch and 19% of the time the sailors predicted 
effectiveness falls below 70%. 
 
Figure 42.  Predicted effectiveness of the sailor with the least average sleep 
amount from the 48 enlisted core crew 
 69
C. LCS SURVEY 
A survey was developed and administered to crew 202/GOLD aboard the  
USS Independence (LCS 2) in January of 2014. A total of 33 sailors completed a baseline 
survey to collect data on certain attributes of the LCS crew and their work patterns during 
an operational underway. The survey was administered to solicit personal opinions on the 
current watch rotations, the workload of departments and positions, and the amount of 
sleep the current watch rotation allows. Question one asked what watch rotation they 
were currently working. Of the 33 sailors (officers and enlisted), 27 actually stood watch. 
Forty-five percent of the 27 LCS 2 sailors were on 5/10 (three-section) watch rotation, as 
shown in Figure 43. 
 
Figure 43.  Watch rotations of survey respondents 
The next couple of questions asked which departments they thought had the 
highest workload and which had the lowest workload. All 33 participants responded that 
they thought engineering department had the highest workload and operations department 
had the lowest. This corresponds directly to the IMPRINT Pro Forces output reports. 
Engineering department had a lot of unplanned events fail between the enlisted core 
crews while operations department had zero. This means that, in the IMPRINT Pro 
Forces module, operations department had sufficient personnel to complete their daily 
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planned activities and successfully complete all unplanned events for all three core-crew 
sizes. Engineering department’s initial manpower deficiency led to many unsuccessful 
unplanned events, but later thrived when additional personnel were added, as shown by 





This thesis was a case study used to validate using government-developed, human 
performance software to assist in fleet manpower determination. The IMPRINT Pro 
Forces module was used to simulate three LCS enlisted core crew sizes (31, 40, and 48) 
and to estimate the capability of each to respond to daily planned activities and unplanned 
events during a typical underway period. In short, we wanted to analyze IMPRINT Pro 
Forces’ capability to determine a core crew size that can adequately operate an LCS ship. 
Comparisons between the models show statistically significant differences in the number 
of unplanned event failures, as proven by the ANOVA and Tukey HSD tests. In other 
words, IMPRINT Pro Forces was able to show that as core crew size increased, system 
performance improved (as evidenced by decreasing failure rates with increasing crew 
size). The enlisted core crew of 40 consistently outperformed the enlisted core crew of 
31, and the enlisted core crew of 48 significantly outperformed both 31 and 40.     
Additional work should be done to refine the baseline settings and underlying model 
assumptions for various platforms. IMPRINT Pro Forces is certainly a valuable tool that 
expands the current manpower requirements determinations capabilities. 
FAST provided another important method to analyze the performance of 
individual sailors as core crew size increases or decreases. We used the sleep and watch 
times from IMPRINT Pro Forces reports in order to model a sailor’s 21-day, IMPRINT 
schedule. The FAST illustrations showed the percentage of time the sailor was under a 
70% effectiveness level on watch. As the core crew size increased, the percentage of time 
a sailor spend under the 70% effectiveness level decreased by a sizeable amount. The 
FAST results showed that LCS core crew size, according to IMPRINT Pro Forces, has a 
significant effect on sailor performance. 
The LCS 2 survey was used to validate IMPRINT and FAST results. Every 
survey respondent stated that engineering department had the highest workload and that 
operations department had the least. The IMPRINT results for the enlisted core crew of 
31 (40 core crew) showed that engineering department had the highest equipment failures 
due a manpower deficiency. When asked what manpower changes should be made to 
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improve the performance of LCS, the majority of LCS 2 survey respondents stated more 
sailors were needed. (Many stated one or two sailors should be added to each 
department.) The IMPRINT Pro Forces and FAST results showed significant 
performance improvement when changing from a core crew of 31 to a core crew of 40, 
and a profound improvement with a core crew of 50.     
By analyzing the results of the three IMPRINT Pro Forces models together with 
the FAST illustrations and the LCS 2 survey results, we conclude that the IMPRINT Pro 
Forces module produces significant and valuable results that can help inform leaders on 
proper crew sizes for LCS. When supplemented with FAST, IMPRINT Pro Forces results 
are even more complete and can highlight individual human performance effectiveness. 
These human performance analysis tools can and should be used by the U.S. Navy for 
ship manpower determination. IMPRINT Pro Forces and FAST can help prevent ship 
manpower overestimation or underestimation and can shorten, or even prevent, 
misalignment of scarce human resources, and/or crew fatigue and improve the precision 


























A. U.S. NAVY 
When a system operates or is designed to operate with minimal manpower and 
reduced redundancy, caution must be paid to the limitations of the human in the system. 
Senior leaders in the Navy should be aware of the sophisticated human performance 
analysis models and tools currently available for manpower determination. IMPRINT Pro 
Forces and FAST have been shown in this case study to more accurately estimate 
workload and human capabilities and can be used to supplement the current NSWW 
calculations.   
Simple policy standards, like watch-rotation capability, can have a large effect on 
crew performance. Watch rotations must be given careful attention as a policy, especially 
when allocating manpower to systems that operate with minimal manning. Watch 
rotations alone can have a damaging effect on a crew’s cognitive performance, thus 
impacting combat effectiveness in a negative way. Understanding how a four-section 
watch rotation will affect a crew verses a crew that is only able to operate a two or three-
section watch has a significant impact on performance over a 2-week period, as shown in 
the FAST outputs for watch rotations in Chapter IV Results. Crew size also will impact 
sailor performance as shown in the IMPRINT Pro FAST schedules. As crew size 
decreases, sailors’ endurance is stretched thin because of human fatigue, and increased 
cognitive load. When crews are not sized adequately, workload can become 
overwhelming and impossible to accomplish within acceptable fatigue levels. Thus, an 
environment is created that is unsafe, unsustainable, and detrimental to crew and material 
readiness.    
As shown in this case study, the DoD has developed and now owns sophisticated 
software that can measure workload and human capabilities within a system. The Navy 
should be aware that different situations require different policy standards. NAVMAC 
should supplement their workload analysis and manpower determination metrics with 
IMPRINT Pro Forces and FAST, in conjunction with updates to the NSWW to more 
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accurately depict actual sailor workload. Accurately determining manpower requirements 
under situations like minimal manning or specially designed system requirements is 
possible with human performance software. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
A Navy-centric database for IMPRINT Pro Forces module should be developed. 
Such a database would significantly improve the flexibility of analysts and provide ad-
hoc query capabilities across multiple platforms. The additional modifications to the 
underlying assumption will also improve the accuracy and details of the results allowing 
for deeper analysis. The IMPRINT Pro Forces module can be used to run simulations for 
other units including other surface platforms, shore commands, and squadrons if specific 
databases for these systems were created and updated (i.e., with Navy personnel rates, 
maintenance standards, and equipment). Evaluating other units further tests the capability 
of IMPRINT Pro Forces to accurately evaluate changing manpower levels.  
This case study was narrow in its scope and only analyzed the enlisted crew of the 
LCS1 platform. The results are not a complete representation of the entire fleet or the rest 
of the LCS fleet for that matter. It is recommended that IMPRINT Pro Forces be used to 
model an entire LCS crew including officers, and also take in effect that corrosion control 
and corrective maintenance are unplanned events as well.   
Further research should expand on the use of IMPRINT Pro Forces reports using 
FAST. Future studies should model the best and least average sleep totals, but should find 
the best and worst of the 100 runs. Paired comparisons can be performed within and 
across various crew sizes. The results will show a more accurate range of average LCS 
core crew sleep amounts over a period of time. 
Another study could run the IMPRINT Pro Forces Module with more innovation 
watch bills like the 3/9, and then compare those with commonly used watch bills. The 
purpose of this study would be to analyze how the change in watch bills affects the crew 
performance in IMPRINT Pro Forces. The final step of the study would be to input the 
IMPRINT sleep and work results into FAST, and compare performance. 
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